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Papa Abel Remembers — The Tale of A Band of
Booksellers, Fascicle 19: Economic Realities
by Richard Abel (Aged Independent Learner) <reabel@q.com>

B

y 1974 the competitive environment
had changed markedly — particularly
in North America. John Coutts’ firm in
Canada, after he spun off from our firm, had not
only garnered a significant fraction of the Canadian scholarly book market but had established
a U.S. presence first for the acquisition of books
published in the U.S. and not co-published by
Canadian publishers and, later, for the marketing of the firm’s services to academic libraries
along the northeastern tier of states. In a parallel
development, several regional booksellers of
scholarly books had emerged from among some
local or specialist booksellers. All of them began
to offer some parts of our services — filling firmorders generated by libraries; standing orders for
books in series, Approval Plans based upon LC
card or MARC records, the supply of cataloging
for books supplied, etc. All had been patterned
after the body of services we had developed.
We well understood that the competition would
imitate this integrated body of services, for we
had widely and openly distributed the relevant
explanatory literature to academic and research
libraries across the continent and abroad. But
we were somewhat taken by surprise at the
number of regional imitators that had sprung up.
In addition, of course, we had to contend with
the assorted regional university networks which
had materialized around the country thanks to
the largesse of various state capital grants and
those of the CLR.
The consequence for the Argonauts was
that we had to work harder at marketing our
services — both in North America and abroad.
The overseas demand for scholarly books was
becoming, both in fact and in our planning
terms, of increasing importance. It had proved
an increasingly profitable segment for the firm.

Biz of Acq
from page 70
five, only one was a computer manual while the
others were surprising: Russian Origins of the
First World War; Place, Writing, and Voice in
Oral History; New Science of Religion: Exploring Spirituality from the Outside In and Bottom
Up; and Metaphor and the Historical Evolution
of Conceptual Mapping. The STLs covered all
subjects across the board, including humanities
(e.g., religion, history, language arts, political science, and literary criticism), science, and social
science (psychology). The cost was $1300.
ebrary offers good statistics at their Website.
It was interesting to see how many and what books
were viewed, how many pages, and how many
user sessions. This again shows that our patrons
were making use of the electronic content.
There are some complications. We discovered that the links to the contents may not work.
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This was not only because overseas libraries
required increasing numbers of scholarly books
published in the English language to compensate
for the dearth of books acquired during the war;
for the massive rebuilding effort demanded after
the cessation of hostilities, and lastly due to
the increasing dominance of English language
scholarship. They also were grateful for the
rapidity of our air-transport system as well as the
fact that we attached no mark-up over list prices
as both the ossified system of book distribution
overseas had imposed and required.
It will be recalled that the business plan
worked out with the underwriting firm, which
had agreed to take the firm public, called for
making this stock offering in 1975. This plan
assumed that our sales volume and level of
profitability were such as to price the shares
at $10. So, we were keenly aware of these
newly-emerged competitors and the exigencies
resulting therefrom. We were maddeningly
pressed by the need of resolving on schedule
the financial stringencies under which we had
labored from virtually the first days of the firm.
Having our necks and spirits relieved by the
removal of this financial albatross was keenly
anticipated by nearly the entire staff. So, we
bent every effort to realizing the objectives of the
financial projections — and were on track to that
end despite the newly emerged competition.
But as the year evolved, the remarkable
inflation, which had already persisted for a
couple of years, became harder to deal with
— particularly in connection with keeping our
wage and salary programs intact. But this difficulty soon proved of lesser significance than a
couple of others which had cropped up. The first
of the latter were that the results of the research
by Charles Marshall into our specific costs

The invoices for STLs are in paper, so the Acquisitions staff will have to design procedures to
accommodate them. The Acquisitions staff will
also need to account for any titles purchased
outside the ebrary/YBP system (standing orders,
Amazon, etc.) to make sure duplicates are not
received.
As more libraries experiment with PDA,
hopefully more will publish about their experiences. The April 17, 2012 issue of the Chronicle
of Higher Education has an article called “Is
psychology about to come undone?” All of the
studies published in the 2008 issues of three psychology journals (Psychological Science; Journal
of Personality and Social Science: Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition) will be reproduced to check the
validity. If psychologists can check the results of
their peers, in that spirit, we hope other libraries
will consider comparing their PDA results. This
version of “PDA” is still a pilot for us, but the
initial results are intriguing.

of doing business were beginning to come in.
They were disquieting. Even more disquieting
was the observation by Keith Barker that our
conventional accounting results were showing
a decline in our profit margins. He recruited
Paul Sibley to help in uncovering the causes of
this decline. Within months the principal cause
was discovered to be the fact that the ratio of the
library-originated orders coming in had been
progressively skewing to a growing number of
orders for hard-to-obtain or no-discount titles or
low-priced short discount books. This finding
could quickly be related back to the increasingly frequent reports from the firm’s various
domestic office managers that libraries that
had switched part of their business to the newly
emerged competition were clearly sending us
all of their orders for hard-to-obtain or no-discount or low-priced titles. Meanwhile, Charles
Marshal’s cost studies had revealed that short
discount books bearing a list price of less than
$20.00 would not support our costs in providing
them. Our firm was, in short, the default supplier
of such books as the other booksellers returned,
such library orders as “OP” or “indefinitely out
of stock” or “not available through the trade”
or other such dodges invented to maintain the
competition’s margins. This was, of course, a
sensible thing for the libraries to do, for we were
prepared, as we had always been, to provide a
total service regardless of our margin. So the
librarians playing this strategy could feel good
about cultivating assumed dealer competition
and satisfying regional loyalties while obtaining
all the profitless materials demanded by faculty
and graduate students.
What was the answer to this cluster of related
problems, which were weighing increasingly
heavily upon our economic viability? After
some months of debate and the examination of
a wide range of alternatives to the resolution
of that conundrum, we settled on a radical approach to the solution to this knot of problems.
We ultimately concluded that a cost-plus pricing
schedule based upon the actual costs of handling
various classes of books and attendant services
best fit our circumstances and the interests of
libraries whose budgets were being increasingly
hard-pressed. Thus, a title carrying a high listprice and a trade discount would command a
far greater discount from list-price than a low
list-price title sold to us at a short discount. By
way of further example, a title in-series would
be assigned a lesser discount if provided as a
library-generated order for the same title — this
to provide for the greater costs incurred in managing and policing the standing order. Yet one
more example: a title supplied on the Approval
Plan would carry a lesser markup than a librarygenerated order, as the former was a mass-produced service while the latter required additional
costs of shelving, picking, and the increased risk
of becoming dead inventory stock.
continued on page 74
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We had a second objective in mind in opting for a cost-plus system. While it would be
marginally more complex to install and operate,
it had the enormous virtue of being a much more
transparent system and could give any half-way
savvy acquisition librarian the means to identify
those dealers playing the traditional games of
diddling discounts — some almost monthly in
response to the news from the financial officer as
to margins. In short, a cost-plus pricing system
would assist librarians in smoking out those
dealers with a penchant for playing fast and
loose with prices and discounting. Thus, costplus pricing placed in the hands of librarians a
superior means to monitor the most effective
management of their materials budgets.
Almost immediately upon the launch of the
cost-plus pricing system, the academic librarians began to complain, some quite vigorously.
The special librarians in corporate and research
libraries in contrast really welcomed it. It seems
that the latter were both accustomed to such
systems, as so many corporate and laboratory
organizations fairly routinely employed such
arrangements in their purchasing or supplying
of services. Further, they valued the ability to
manage their library materials budget, for that
is the environment in which they operated. The
reasons behind the near-universal and visceral
academic library dislike of the system puzzles
me. I still have no satisfying explanation therefor
even today.
When the North American office managers
met shortly after the introduction of the cost-plus
discounting system, they were opposed to it to
a man and strongly urged a hasty return to the
traditional pricing method. So, on the strength
of these remonstrances we reverted back to the
old practices.
But with this reversion we were faced with
the associated return of the unpleasant financial
facts that had led to the decision to move to a more
rational and transparent pricing practice. What
were we to do? We had to solve our long-term
capital requirements. But we were faced by an
apparently insoluble competitive predicament.
We were left to generating some other ethical and
transparent but rational pricing system to replace
the traditionally obscure and easily abused system
which had been the practice from before the time
the firm had ever become a specialist dealer to
academic and research libraries.
But other events overtook this effort — we
were now faced with the sudden onset of the
sharp recession that began in earnest in mid-1974.
The firm had successfully weathered a couple
of earlier recessions and the almost universal
associated tightening of cash flow. These earlier
downturns had created genuine difficulties, but
we had succeeded in dealing with the accompanying slowdown in cash flow. But in the 1974
recession everyone seemed to be hoarding cash.
The consequence for our firm was that our average account-receivable (the money owing us for
books and services delivered on open account)
moved from the usual 70-75 days from invoice
date to payment received date to 106 days. This
rapid slowing of cash flow occurred in less than
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six months. So, by the summer of 1974 we had
reached the 106-day mark.
Now, this length of time, 106 days, was well in
excess of the more-or-less informal 90-day terms
allowed library booksellers by most publishers
who well understood the realities of institutional
accounting. But another financial exigency appeared. To provide the working capital needed
to operate the firm, we borrowed from a local
bank. Our terms with the bank were that we
would pay several points over prime. (Banks
do not feel comfortable with financing things so
seldom in demand as books and so vaporous as
Approval Plans and book-cataloging.) The even
more onerous term in these recessional circumstances was that they would finance our accounts
receivable for only 90 days. By the summer of
1974 our interest rate had climbed to 21.5%.
This percentage was well over our margins, so
we were losing money on every sale. And our
average account receivable was outstanding 106
days, so we possessed inadequate working capital
to sustain our operations. We were operating at
about $4 million of purchases a month at this
point, so obviously we needed an injection of cash
in the amount of roughly $2 million. We were
not going to long survive in these circumstances
absent additional working capital.
I brought aboard Fred Meikle, who had
distinguished himself as a business consultant
and a proved manager in difficult settings, to run
the operation while I sought to raise capital. The
latter demanded extended trips and stays in the
principal money markets of the U.S.
My first assay was in New York City to the
underwriter which had agreed to take the firm
public — and whose man in charge of putting
together such flotations had assured me at the time
of signing with them that his firm always stood
by clients when they experienced hard times.
After several weeks, as they considered what to
do, I was called to learn that if they supplied the
cash we needed they would lose money on the
securities they would have to sell to do so. This
became an all too common recital — the front
office seeming to be interested in and prepared
to work with us only to be told after many submissions of data and projections followed by
conversations that the back office had rejected
any help. So, we were faced with discovering
and pursuing other avenues of financing to tide
us over this recessional period and to the time
when receipts against receivables had returned
to their normal cycle.
Lyman Newlin was a daily companion in
these pursuits as I was virtually living in New
York City, and the city was his stomping ground.
We, together with Keith Barker by phone, finally
concluded that our best shot was to try to sell an
interest in the firm rather than continue to seek a
loan of some kind. To this end we went to some
old friends now retired from various publishing
houses gathered together by Cameron Moseley
(Mose) and known as Moseley Associates.
Moseley Associates were then the leading publishing consultants and were involved in a variety
of deals in the book trade. We also turned to
Daniel Melcher, who had retired after selling the
Bowker Company. Some unlikely help turned
up from several of the immigrant publishers
from Germany and Austria, who had founded

outstanding publishing firms in the United States
— most especially Walter Johnson. They too
had lived through hard times and by virtue of long
associations in the international trade recognized
the commitment of the Argonauts to the book and
to the brokering of knowledge world-wide and
of the value and contribution of the firm to the
international scholarly book trade.
These several generous supporters pointed
to or introduced us to prospective backers not
only in and around New York City but in Boston, Chicago, and elsewhere as well. As these
prospects were suggested I traveled to meet
with them to make our case. Several expressed
a genuine interest but as was becoming an almost
universal response, they concluded that the losses
they would suffer in selling financial assets in a
depressed financial market to raise the amount we
needed might well not repay them for the risk they
would sustain by investing in the firm.
In the course of these various conversations I
picked up the rumor on several occasions that the
Blackwell family was tentatively seeking to gain
a footing in North America. So, in the spirit of
leaving no stone unturned I called the Blackwell
offices in Oxford. I was put through to Miles,
the son of Richard Blackwell, who was then the
CEO of the firm. Miles was the chief factotum
of the library supply division of the firm. Our
conversation was cordial, and Miles seemed
encouraging. Within a week or two Miles called
back to advise that he, his father, and the CEO of
Blackwell Scientific, Per Saugman would like
to come to Portland to talk with us. Arrangements
were made, and the meeting was soon arranged.
To make a long story short multiple trips by both
organizations between Portland and Oxford were
made — complicated by the Christmas and New
Year holidays. A solution to our problems seemed
to be close to realization.
At the end of the day, however, it became clear
that the Blackwells had settled on a strategy of
letting our firm go into involuntary bankruptcy
at the hands of the bank. After the bank had
auctioned off those assets which Blackwell did
not want, Blackwell would buy from the bank,
for the balance on the bank’s loan to our former
firm, those assets which they wanted — the
integrated Approval Plan software, standing
order, and cataloging software; the bibliographic
and cataloging databases; office and warehouse
furnishings, etc.
Some of the managers seeing the handwriting on the wall sensibly spun off into separate
businesses doing the same thing. The largest of
these in the United States was Academic Booksellers. Tom Slatner started a United Kingdom
firm under his name to deal with the former UK
libraries. Bernhard Starkmann started a Dutch
firm under his name to deal with the former Continental libraries. Both of the latter opened U.S.
buying offices to supply their libraries with their
North American titles. Starkmann ultimately
bought Slatner out and removed his company
to London from Amsterdam.
And so the Band of Argonauts went their various ways, some in company with others of the
Band, the remainder as single, venturer bookmen.
It is hard for me to imagine anyone ever again
assembling such a formidable and competent
band of knowledge brokers.
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